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THE FAMILY CAR DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION
It may be stated that generally a parent is not liable for the
torts of his minor children.' One exception which is recognized in
some jurisdictions is the "family car doctrine",' also given such
names as "family purpose doctrine",' "family automobile doctrine",'
or the "family rule",' and probably others. Whatever it may be called,
it seems to be an illegitimate child of the law which has been ac-
cepted only out of social necessity and then rationalized by means of
legal fictions.
The family car doctrine, as it shall be referred to herein,' has
been stated to be " that, where the head of a family maintains an
automobile for pleasure, convenience, and use of his family, he is
liable for injuries inflicted in the negligent operation of the car
while it is being used by members of the family for their own pleas-
ure or purpose. "' A review of the decisions indicates that it ex-
tends not only to the protection of a pedestrian who may be injured
by the operation of a family automobile, but also to the operators
of other motor vehicles,' and that it relates to both property" and
personal" injury.
Although a parent is not responsible for the torts of the infant
simply by reason of paternity, the infant has generally been held
liable himself.- The relationship of parent and child will not, per se,
establish the liability of the parent for the negligent operation of
the family automobile. There must exist in addition the relationship
of master and servant, or principal and agent." Likewise, as between
the spouses, under some statutes one is generally not liable for the
torts of the other," and thus some basis for liability must be found to
'PROSSER, TORTS sec. 100 (1941).
'Bryant v. Keen, 43 Ga. App. 251, 158 S.E. 445 (1931), Felcyn
v Gamble, 184 Minn. 357, 241 N.W 37 (1932), Hart v. Hogan, 173
Wash. 598, 24 P 2d 99 (1933)
'Morton v Hall, 149 Ark. 428, 232 S.W 934 (1921)
'Morken v St. Pierre, 147 Minn. 106, 179 N.W 681 (1920).
5Mooney v Canier, 198 Iowa 251, 197 N.W 625 (1924)
0 The term "family car doctrine" seems more descriptive of the
function that this concept serves than some of the other terms, since
it demonstrates that this rule relates only to the family and to the car
furnished for the family use; it also has the merit of being short.
Jones v Knapp, 104 Vt. 5, -, 156 Atl. 399, 400 (1931).
'Emanuelson v. Johnson, 148 Minn. 417, 182 N.W 521 (1921).
'Grier v Woodside, 200 N.C. 759, 158 S.E. 491 (1931).1 Turner v Gackle, 168 Minn. 514, 209 N.W 626 (1926).
" Hart v Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P 2d 99 (1933).
"PROSSER, TORTS sec. 100 (1941).
"See Litz v Harman, 151 Va. 363, -, 144 S.E. 477, 481 (1928).
"MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS sec. 64 (1931), 27 AM. Jun. secs. 478-479 p. 476 (1936)
(to the effect that many statutes have abolished the liability of a
STUDENT NOTES AND COIMENTS
exist. To create the latter, where no actual agency exists, the family
car doctrine, which has been said to be " a fictitious agency with-
out any basis in fact "Z is invoked. It is " one of the fictions
most commonly resorted to '-
In order fully to understand this doctrine, certain questions must
be answered. At the outset it should be noted that less than half of
the forty-eight states appear to have accepted it. Obviously, the
answers to the questions raised in the ensuing discussion are appli-
cable only in those states which do purport to apply the doctrine.
First, what is the legal basis of the doctrine? The courts under
the maxim respondeat superior, long ago established that the
principal is liable for the torts of the agent when committed within
the scope of the employment.' This liability is predicated on con-
siderations of social policy and is not dependent upon authorization
of the tort by a principal; otherwise there might never be a basis
for liability because a tort would rarely be authorized.' Although
a wife is not an agent per se of her husband, nor is a child agent
per se of the parent, yet if employed m the business of the husband
or parent either may become an agent, and the usual consequences
of the principal's liability for the agent's tort may ensue. The family
car doctrine goes a step further and not only establishes this liability
for an unauthorized tort, but places liability on one who is not m
reality a principal or master by creating a sort of family agency
which makes a member of the family using the family automobile
an agent of the head of the family during such use.-
The courts in jurisdictions where the doctrine is applied have
expressed two possible legal bases for it. A Kentucky court, states:
"The family purpose doctrine is founded on the
relationship of principal and agent; the theory being
husband for the torts of his wife). The following states which have
accepted the family car doctrine are among those that have statutes
either completely or partially abrogating the common law liability
of the husband for wife's torts: Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Minne-
sota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Texas, Washington, and West
Virgima. Compare McDowell v Hurner, 142 Ore. 611, 20 P 2d 395
(1933) (showing states accepting the doctrine) with 3 VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAwS sec. 157 p. 72-84 (1931) (showing states
having statutes removing husband's common law liability), 41 C.J.S.
sec. 219 (b) p. 711 (1944) (wife cannot be held liable for husband's
torts in which she did not participate in the absence of agency re-
action.)
'PROSSER, TORTS sec. 66 (1941).
'Ibid.
'McDowell v Hurner, 142 Ore. 611, 20 P 2d 395 (1933)
'"2 Am. Jum. sec. 359 p. 278 (1936).
MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY sees. 499-501 (3d
ed. 1923).
Id. sec. 515.
"Steele v. Age's AdmIistratrix, 233 Ky 714, 26 S.W 2d 563
(1930).
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that if one maintains an automobile or other vehicle
for the general use, pleasure and convenience of mem-
bers of his family, and it is being used by one of them
for that purpose when an accident occurs, the one so
using the machine will be deemed the agent of the
owner and to have been operating the car under the
owner's authority, which may be either express or
Implied."'
Nearly all other states adopting the doctrine place it on a similar
basis of either principal and agent, or master and servant.' In ac-
cord is a North Carolina decision' which maintains that a member
of the family in using the family automobile for his convenience and
pleasure represents the head of the family in so doing, and this court
stresses the point that liability will depend only on whether the
member of the family was using the car for the purpose for which
it was provided.'
However, a federal court ' has said that the family car doctrine is
a departure from the master-servant theory and is based on the
"dangerous instrumentality" theory. This basis is not widely ac-
cepted, but rather, "The courts have very generally refused to ap-
ply the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to automobiles. The
Florida cases are a conspicuous exception ,,2
Upon whom does the family car doctrine impose liability9 The
courts have been unanimous in fixing liability upon the head of the
family, at least where he was the owner of the automobile which
was involved in the accident. However, when a question has arisen
involving the extension of the doctrine to place liability upon
another member of the family who owns the automobile and fur-
nishes it for the pleasure and convenience of the family, conflicts
are found in the courts' decisions.
"Memhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 272, 17 S.W 2d 5 (1928),
Hopkins v Droppes, 184 Wise. 400, 198 N.W 738 (1924) (family
motorcycle doctrine), cf. Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N.W
37 (1932) (where the court refused to apply the doctrine to motor-
boats although it was applied to automobiles in that jurisdiction).
' Steele v Age's Admiiistratrix, 233 Ky. 714, 716, 26 S.W 2d
563, 564 (1930)
2'Donn v Kunz, 52 Ariz. 219, 79 P 2d 965 (1938), Griffin v.
Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S.E. 10 (1915), Buss v. Wachsmith, 190
Wash. 673, 70 P 2d 417 (1937)
Grier v. Woodside, 200 N.C. 759, 158 S.E. 491 (1931).
In Lashbrook v. Patten, 1 Duv. 316 (Ky 1864) the court
stated that a minor son was dicharging a duty usually performed by
a slave when he was driving his sisters to a picnic in his father's
carriage, and for purposes of this suit he was to be regarded as his
father's servant.
-Turoff v Burch, 50 F 2d 986, 987, 60 App. D.C. 221 (1931).
SMECHEM, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY p. 116 (3d ed.
1942)
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In a Minnesota case in 1920,2 it was questioned whether the
doctrine would extend to include such cases. The question was not
then decided, but later the court placed liability on a son, who owned
and kept the automobile, for injuries caused by his father when the
father was driving with his consent. In Georgia," a married woman
who was not the head of the family was held liable when her minor
son caused injury by the negligent operation of her car. The court
was of the opinion that there was no merit in a contention that this
rule was applicable only when the father, who was the head of the
family, owned the auto. They said the doctrine would apply to a
mother or to any other member of the family.'
North Dakota takes a very different view when the owner of
the automobile is not the head of the family. In Posey v. Krogh,'
an adult daughter, the owner of an automobile, consented to her
minor brother operating it and was not liable for his negligent
operation. Both she and the minor brother were members of their
father's household, and the court pointed out that the brother was
not a member of her family and "She was not herself the head of a
family M1
In Kentucky,' the court refused to hold the head of the family,
the father, liable under the family car doctrine when the wife owned
the automobile, even though she deferred to the wishes of her hus-
band in the operation of it. In another case in the same state,' where
there was a dispute which turned on whether a mother or a father
was the owner of the automobile, it was held that one of the m-
dispensable requisites of the family car doctrine is that the person
on whom it is sought to fix liability must own, maintain or provide
an automobile for the family use. At the same time, it is not neces-
sary in Kentucky that the defendant be both the head of the family
and the owner of the car. 7 Ownership is sufficient in Kentucky, as
in Minnesota and Georgia. And as has been previously indicated,
merely being the head of the family has apparently never been held
sufficient if some other member of the family owns or provides the
car. In Mitchell v. Mullert' the court expressly refused to hold the
-See Morken v. St. Pierre, 147 Minn. 106, -, 179 N.W 681, 682
(1920).
"Turner v. Gackle, 168 Minn. 514, 209 N.W 626 (1926)
'Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 77, 176 S.E. 540 (1934)
- Id. at -, 176 S.E. at 541.
'65 N.D. 490, 259 N.W 757 (1934).
*"Id. at -, 259 N.W at 760.
"'Smith v Overstreet's Admr., 258 Ky 781, 81 S.W 2d 571
(1935).
Euster v. Vogel, 227 Ky. 735, 13 S.W 2d 1028 (1929)
'Steele v Age's Administratrix, 233 Ky 714, 26 S.W 2d 563
(1930) (mother, owner of automobile was held liable for son's negli-
gent operation, although not the head of the family)
"'45 Ga. App. 285, 164 S.E. 278 (1932)
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defendant father liable, where a mother-rn-law owned the automo-
bile and at the time the defendant's son was operating it, he was
using it with the consent of the defendant's wife and was on an
errand for her.
It would appear that in states such as North Dakota where the
family car doctrine is applied but where there is a refusal to extend
it to situations where the car is owned by one not the head of the
family, the party injured through the negligent operation of a car by
a financially irresponsible member of the family would be without
remedy in the absence of a statute.'
Of course, as will be seen, if there is a bailment to the father,
or some property interest in the automobile resting in the head of
the family, there would be a basis on which to predicate liability, and
control of the automobile by the father might alone be sufficient.4'
But cases frequently arise where none of these requisite elements
exist in the father, and if it is desirable to hold him liable in any
event, it can only be done by statute. No statute of this type has
been found. The better approach in any event would seem to be to
impose liability on the owner of the car, as is done in Minnesota,
Georgia and Kentucky.
What, if any, property interest in the automobile must the de-
fendant have as a prerequisite to liability9 It is not necessary that
he be the owner of the automobile if he has some property interest
in it.' In Kentucky,2 when an automobile was left with a son by an
owner and an accident occured while the father, not the owner, was
riding in it with the son, the court refused to apply the doctrine and
would not impose liability on the father because there was no evi-
dence of either ownership or control on the father's part. On the
other hand, a Minnesota court' placed liability on a father where
he borrowed an automobile for his adult daughter to drive some
visitors to a station, although he was not in the car when the acci-
dent occurred. And in an early Texas case," the defendant was held
liable when he had the custody and control of ins employer's auto-
mobile, and his son had an accident, even though the father was not
Michigan and New York have statutes imposing liability upon
the owner of the automobile for its negligent operation by another
which are construed in the following cases: Stapleton v Independent
Brewing Co., 198 Mich. 170, 164 N.W 520 (1917), Atwater v. Lober,
133 Misc. 652, 233 N.Y.S. 309 (1929), cf. Gordon v Rose, 54 Idaho
502, 33 P 2d 351 (1934) (Statute providing for owner's liability as
jointly and severally with minor when he knowingly permits minor
under 16 to drive), Ostergard v Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N.E. 2d
537 (1948) (defendant held liable for a thief's negligent operation of
is automobile under the Illinois statute)
"Holland v Goode, 188 Ky. 525, 526, 222 S.W 950, 951 (1920).
4 tPROssER, ToRTs sec. 66 (1941)
"Holland v. Goode, 188 Ky 525, 222 S.W 950 (1920)
"Emanuelson v. Johnson, 148 Minn. 417, 182 N.W 521 (1921).
23 S.W 2d 860 (Tex. Civ App. 1929).
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in the auto, and he claimed that he did not know his son was using it.
On the basis of these cases, it would appear that some property in-
terest, even if only that of mere bailee, is a prerequisite to liaoility.
What relationship must exist between the defendant and the
negligent operator of the automobile before liability will be imposed
on the former 9 It may be stated broadly that the family car doctrine
is applicable only to acts of members of the family for whose use the
defendant maintains the automobile and who are permitted by the
defendant to use it.'" But who are "members of the family"?
(a) The Child. Little question, if any, seems to have arisen con-
cerning the applicability of the family car doctrine to the unemanci-
pated minor child, since the latter is generally recognized as falling
within the rule." The courts are not in such agreement concerning
the adult child, and much variance is found in the decisions of differ-
ent jurisdictions. For instance, Georgia and Kentucky take conflict-
ing stands concern.ng the adult child. Georgia has placed a self-
supporting, adult son, residing in the home of the father without
charge, in the same category as the minor child, and held the father
liable under the doctrine." Kentucky maintains that the rule does
not apply to the use of the family automobile by adult children,
whether living in the home with their father" or not' The reason
given by the court is that there is no legal or moral duty on the
father to support, even though the adult child lives in the household.'
(b) The Spouse. Since the Married Women's Act have emanci-
pated the wife in practically all the American states and she as now
legally able to hold real and personal property in her own name,
separate and free from the control of her husband, "', a judgment
against a wife may be satisfactorily enforced. It is often the case,
however, that the family automobile and all other property As, in
fact owned by the husband, even where there is such an emancipa-
tion statute. Therefore, a judgment and levy against a wife might
frequently be returned unsatisfied for lack of property. The family
car doctrine properly applied might relieve hardship in such a situa-
tion. Of course, in states such as Michigan which have statutes im-
posing liability upon the owner of the automobile for the negligent
operation by another with h.s consent (see rnfra) the same result
may be obtained by the application of the statute.
" 42 C.J. sec. 840 p. 1083 n. 7-8 (1928).
"'Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S.W 52 (1912).
"Hubert v. Harpe, 181 Ga. 168, 182 S.E. 167 (1935).
"United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Hall, 237 Ky.
393, 35 S.W 2d 550 (1931).
" Creaghead v Hafele's Administrator, 236 Ky 250, 32 S.W 2d
997 (1930).
"Miracle v. Cavins, 254 Ky 644, 72 S.W 2d 25 (1934).
"' MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS sec. 42 (1931).
L.J,-11
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In jurisdictions where tis doctrine is applied, the husband is
generally held liable for his wife's negligent operation of is car."
In order to establish such liability, it must be shown that Lhe auto-
mobile was kept by the husband for the family use.P But a wife who
is the owner of the car has also been held liable for her husband's
negligent driving, even when it was maintained for both family and
business purposes.' Wyant v. Phillips' illustrates the usual rule that
the owner of the car need not be the head of the family to come
within the family car doctrine. In another case' it was left to the
jury whether the husband should be liable for his wife's negligence
when neither -of them owned the automobile, but it was owned by a
minor daughter, who had won it in a contest. There was sufficient
evidence that the father so used and controlled the automobile as to
make him liable.
When a conflict arose between the family car doctrine and a
statute declaring that a husband is not liable per se for the torts of
his wife, it was held that the statute did not preclude liability under
the doctrine."
In community property states the problem is somewhat differ-
ent. Thus in Washington," both the marital community and the hus-
band were held liable for the negligent operation of the automobile
by the husband although the wife was not a passenger. In Arizona,
however, the court refused to imlose liability on the husband for a
tort committed by his wife in the community automobile although
the community was held.G' This decision was based on the fact that
the automobile was furnished by the husband not as the head of the
family but as an agent for another entity, the community. It was
stated here that if there was any liability for an accident aside from
that of the wife, the liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior had to be imposed on the owner of the car, the community,
and not upon either of the individual members. If these cases are
,construed together, it would seem that the community is liable in
any event.
(c) Other Members of the Family. The rule under discussion
both by definition' and by precedent" is restricted to members of the
r'Petway v McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647, 171 S.E. 225 (1933), Hart
,v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P 2d 99 (1933), see Lyon v Lyon, 205
X.C. 326, -, 171 S.E. 356, 357 (1933)
'Williams v Rubenstein, 61 App. D.C. 256, 61 F 2d 575 (1932).
rGoldstein v Johnson, - Ga. App.-, 12 S.E. 2d 92 (1940),
But see Webb v Daniel. 261 Ky. 810, 88 S.W 2d 926 (1935).
116 W Va. 207, 179 S.E. 303 (1935)
'l"Matthews v. Cheatham, 210 N.C. 592, 188 S.E. 87 (1936)
'Plasch v Fass, 144 Minn. 44, 174 N.W 438 (1919)
r"King V Williams, 188 Wash. 350, 62 P 2d 710 (1936), cf.
Newbury v. Remington, 184 Wash. 665, 52'-P. 2d 312 (1935) (court
refused to apply the doctrine to a tort committed by alighting from
the automobile and assaulting another).
' Donn v Kunz, 52 Ariz. 219, 79 P 2d 965 (1938).
'Jones v Knapp, 156 Atl. 399 (Vt. 1931).
"Wolfson v Rainey, 180 S.E. 913 (Ga. App. 1935)
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family. As a general rule, it may be said that this means members of
the immediate family, such as the spouse and children.' - However,
some courts construe the term "members of the family" broadly,
and circumstances may arise where a relative other than one of the
immediate family will be considered such.' Thus, whether a person
is a member of the family within the rule may be a question for the
jury, as in the North Carolina case of McGee v. Crawford0 There it
was said that the term "family" is
"1 an elastic expression, and must necessarily
vary with given facts and circumstances, but the de-
scription of the relationship given by our court
implies: (1) Those who live in the same household,
subject to the general management and control of the
head thereof; (2) dependence of the members upon
such supervising, controlling, and managing head; (3)
mutual gratuitous services with no intention on one
hand of paying for such services, and no expectation on
the other receiving reward or compensation."'
However, as will appear, this broad definition is rarely accepted.
Although, as has been seen, the Georgia court has included the adult
son in applying the doctrine, it held in another case ' that "family"
does not include a son-in-law, even one living in the same house
with his father-in-law. "The son-in-law is not a member of the
father-in-law's family; neither, for that matter is the daughter after
she becomes the son-in-law's wife."'
A son has been held liable for his father's negligence by a Min-
nesota court, under the doctrine, where the father was driving the
son's car.' And liability has been imposed upon an unmarried man
for the tort of his unmarried sister, where the man owned the car
and was the head of the household in which the sister lived.r But,
attempts have failed, to extend the doctrine to include a minor
nephew residing in the household, ' brother-rn-law residing in the
household and sharing expenses, ' an adult stepson, ' and a cousin. '
'-5 Am. JUo., sec. 370 p. 708 (1936).
Ibid.
'205 N.C. 318, 171 S.E. 326 (1933)
""
' Id at -, 171 S.E. at 327.
"Bryant v. Keen, 43 Ga. App. 251, -, 158 S.E. 445, 446 (1931).
" Ibid.
"'Turner v. Gackle, 168 Minn. 514, 209 N.W 626 (1926)
"'Levy v. Rubin, 181 Ga. 187, 182 S.E. 176 (1935).
€"Kentucky v. Maryland Casualty Co., 112 F 2d 352 (C.C.A. 6th
1940).
" Jones v. Golick, 46 Nev. 10, 206 Pac. 679 (1922)
'Mooney v. Canier, 198 Iowa 251, 197 N.W 625 (1924)
"
' Johnston v. Hare, 30 Ariz. 253, 246 Pac. 546 (1926) (an addi-
tional -ground that it was not a family car also precluded the appli-
cation of the doctrine in this case).
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For what purpose must the car be used in order to make a de-
fendant liable? The comfort and pleasure of the family are generally
held to be proper purposes for the application of the family car doc-
trme.' In Wolfson v. Rainey,' a Georgia case, it was said that
" when an automobile, kept by a father for the comfort and
pleasure of his family is being used for the purpose, it is being used
within the scope of the business of the father."'
On the other hand, where the car is used for some purpose other
than mere pleasure or convenience, even though the use be very
advantageous to the driver, the owner or head of the family is not
liable. Thus, where a son was using the father's car incident to the
son's employment, the father was not liable.'
According to the Nebraska court' the weight of authority is
that the owner of an automobile is liable for the negligent driving
of his child when the car is also occupied by other members of the
family and is being used for one of the purposes for which it is kept
when the accident occurs. In such situations, where one member of
the family is driving other members, the courts can easily find a
family purpose. Such was the case of Litz v. Harman,' where the
defendant's minor son was operating the car with his mother and
sister as passengers for the purpose of taking groceries to camp. It
was stated in this case that the family car doctrine was applicable,
the car being used by members of the family for a purpose for which
it was bought. The father was here held liable without modifying
decisions of that state, which would not impose liability on the basis
of a relationship of father and son alone.
In Litz v. Harman, the family car doctrine was applied although
the court acknowledged that the state had rejected it' and that in
general it was not followed. In such cases, the courts easily find a
master-servant relationship between the father and the son in that
the son was operating the automobile on behalf of the father to pro-
vide pleasure for other members of the family A fortiori, when a
child or other member of the family is driving the owner and an
accident occurs, an agency relationship is discernible. A widow was
chargeable for the negligent operation of a car by her son, when she
"Bryant v Keen, 43 Ga. App. 251, 158 S.E. 445 (1931), Grif-
fin v Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S.E. 10 (1915).
180 S.E. 913 (Ga. App. 1935)
Ibid.
7Scates v Sandefer, 163 Tenn. 558, 44 S.W 2d 310 (1931)
' See Stevens v Luther, 105 Nev 184, -, 180 N.W 87, 88
(1920).
151 Va 363, 14 S.E. 477 (1928)
' Rule was rejected in Blair v Broadwater, 121 Va. 301, 93 S.E.
632 (1917). For other states that have rejected the family car doc-
trine see McDowell v Hurner, 142 Ore. 611, -, 20 P 2d 395, 400
(1933) (dissenting opinion)
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was with him at the time of the accident.' Both the doctrine of
principal and agent (or master and servant) and the family car
doctrine were said to be applicable. But there is authority for hold-
ing that where an actual agency exists the family car doctrine does
not apply. 2
Is defendant's consent to the use of the car a prerequisite to his
liability9 The matter of consent and knowledge of the parent as to
the use of the automobile by a child has been of importance in sev-
eral cases. It has been held that the parent would not be liable where
the child was driving the automobile without either the express or
implied consent of the parent.' And where a son surreptitiously
took the family automobile without his father's knowledge and in
direct violation of his instructions, the father was not liable for the
negligent operation.' But the requirement of consent has been liber-
ally construed by some courts and tacit acquiescence of the father
has been held sufficient.' Circumstances surrounding the use of the
family car may be sufficient proof of consent, or may at least raise
a presumption. For example, some courts place the burden on the
defendant mother to overcome the presumption that her son was
driving the automobile for her when the evidence showed that the
automobile was habitually and openly used by the child, the infer-
ence being that the automobile was operated with the authority of
the parent."
"The great weight of authority," it is said,' " neither upholds
nor condemns this doctrine." It has, however, been subjected to
considerable criticism and a very large portion of this is due to the
fact that the rule is founded on a fictitious agency. "Some courts
have stretched the law of agency to the breaking point in order to
fasten liability on a paying defendant "' And insofar as the
courts have attempted to create an agency relationship from the
circumstances surrounding the family car and its use, the criticism
probably was merited. One court' maintains that after the automo-
bile came into common use, it was no longer considered a dangerous
thing, and then the courts had to resort to the rules of agency to
establish a defendant's liability, since the general liability of the
owner of the automobile lingered. The phrasing of the court is
novel when it says, "If son took his best girl riding, prima facie
"Pearson v. Northland Transp. Co., 1184 Minn. 560, 239 N.W
602 (1931).
'Trice v. Bridgewater, 125 Tex. 75, 81 S.W 2d 63 (1935).
"Steele v. Hemmers, 40 P 2d 1022 (Ore. 1935)
'' Sale v. Atkins, 206 Ky 224, 267 S.W 223 (1924).
Barr v. Searcy, 280 Ky 535, 133 S.W 2d 714 (1939).
"Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777, 176 S.E. 540 (1934),
Wells v. Lockhart, 258 Ky. 698, 81 S.W 2d 5 (1935).
T McDowell v. Hurner, 142 Ore. 611, -, 20 P 2d 395, 398 (1933).
'"Id. at -, 20 P 2d at 401.
"Watkins v Clark, 103 Kan. 629, 176 Pac. 131 (1918).
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it was father's little outing by proxy, and if an accident happened,
prima facie father was liable.' ' a
There are decisions, on the other hand, that sustain the agency
basis, or at least refuse to conden the doctrine on that account. It
has been stated9 ' that the law of agency extends to more than busi-
ness transactions, and if a father buys an automobile for the con-
vemence and pleasure of his family, and gives it to a son who uses
it for this purpose, the son is furthering the father's purpose, and
this is true whether it is called his "business" or not. In Griffin v.
Russell,2 the opinon of the court is to the effect that although
"business" is most commonly used m regard to renumerative busi-
nesses, it is not limited to such pursuits. It has further been said,
'We think the practical administration of justice between the parties
is more the duty of the court than the preservation of some esoteric
theory concernng the law of principal and agent."
C
"
One court declared that this rule " is merely applying old
principles to new conditions." It is now suggested that the old prin-
ciples are no longer adequate and that statutes, similar to those al-
ready enacted in some states,' are needed. These statutes not only
serve as guides to the courts and render the law more stable, but
also when properly enacted and interpreted by the courts are more
efficient.
The Michigan statute provides (1) that the owner of the auto-
mobile is responsible for all injuries negligently inflicted while it 3s
being operated with his consent, express or implied; and (2) that il
shall be conclusively presumed that the automobile is being used
with the knowledge and consent of the owner, if it is being operated
at the time of the injury by a member of the immediate family of
the defendant.6
It is doubtful that, even if the family car doctrine were applied
by a very liberal court, it could be as effective in its application to
the owner of the automobile as the above statute. Such a court by
following precedent could only make the rule apply to (a) the
owner, when the automobile is owned by the head of the family,
and used with permission by a member of the family; (b) the
owner, when the automobile is owned by a member of a family and
used with permission by another member; (c) the owner, when the
automobile is owned by a marital community and used by one of
the members; (d) the head of the family, when he is a bailee of an
automobile being used with his permission by a member of the
'OId. at -, 176 Pac. at 131-132.
"
1King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W 296 (1918).
144 Ga. 275, 87 S.E. 10 (1915).
"King v Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, -, 204 S.W 296, 298 (1918).
"Jones v Cook, 90 WVa. 710, 111 S.E. 828 (1922).
'See note 38 supra.
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family. Perhaps too, such a court could sanction a very liberal defi-
nition of "member of the family," as well as a rebuttable presump-
tion that the car was being operated with the consent of the owner
when operated by a member of his (or her) family
But it is doubtful if even a very liberal court would close its eyes
to the purpose for which the automobile was supplied and used,
while under such a statute it easily could. And, of course, the court
could not hold the owner liable under the doctrine where he had
bailed the car to any person not connected by family ties, unless for
the purpose of a "true agency." The doctrine applies only to opera-
tion of a car for family purposes by members of the family, and for
this reason a statute is more effective since it can extend liability
beyond the family relationship to include any situation where the
owner allows another to drive his automobile. Indeed, the Illinois
statute has been held to impose liability upon the owner for the
negligent operation by a thief."
If the majority of the courts had in the beginning accepted the
automobile as a dangerous instrumentality, the same results, or even
better results in some situations, could have been arrived at under
that rule than under the family car doctrine. The dangerous in-
strumentality theory, insofar as it would pertain to the automobile,
would be based on negligence in entrusting a dangerous thing to an
incompetent personY' This would abolish legal fiction and establish
symmetry in the law.' Under it an owner would be liable both in the
family situation and beyond. But a statute might still go farther and
place liability on the owner even where he was not negligent and
had entrusted the automobile to an apparently capable person, thus
imposing a strict liability
In order for a court to impose strict liability without fault, in
the absence of statute, the thing must be inherently dangerous and
the automobile is felt to be comparatively safe if operated care-
fully."" Automobiles have become so commonly used in traffic as
supposedly to forbid the application of extraordinary rules of lia-
bility for their reckless operation,"°' and have been placed in the
same classification with golf clubs which may be handled carelessly
to the injury of some person." Although the automobile has been
regarded as a dangerous instrumentality by a few courts,'L1 it is
doubtful if many courts would go so far as to impose strict liability
under this theory."' I
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The family car doctrine and a qualified dangerous instrumen-
tality theory might overlap where one allowed an incompetent mem-
ber of his family to drive. But neither rule is sufficiently inclusive.
The instrumentality theory would not include a competent member
of the family who was financially irresponsible and who had caused
injury by the negligent operation of another member's automobile.
Nor would the family car doctrine include a "bailee" of an auto-
mobile not a member of the owner's family who is incompetent and
financially irresponsible. Only by legislative enactment can this
problem be solved, but the family car doctrine properly applied
appears to serve a beneficial and necessary purpose as far as it
goes.
MARNE Q. MILLER.
